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-SKILLS, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
PETERB. KENEN • COLUMBIAUNIVERSITY
Thispaper will deal with two important questions: (1) What have we
already learned about the role of skills, human capital or, more broadly,
knowledge, in determining national comparative advantage and, there-
fore, the structure of external trade? (2) What are the chief implications
of the facts we have at hand, and what do we need to learn, whether by
the speculative methods of the theorist or the patient efforts of the
•
'-.. empiricist?My answers to these questions will be incomplete. I shall,
indeed, spend more time posing a series of subsidiary questions under
each main rubric than answering the two I have already asked. This
exercise, however, may inspire new research on what may be the most
exciting single issue facing specialists in foreign trade and those who
are concerned with problems of development.
RESEARCH ON HUMAN CAPITAL AND FOREIGN TRADE
RESEARCH on this subject stems from two quite different papers by Kravis
and Leontief.1 The former, on wage rates in major trading industries,
found that, in the U. S. case, the chief export industries pay somewhat
NOTE: I am grateful to Carol Gersti and Constantin Voivodas for research assis-
tance, and to the International Economics Workshop, Columbia University, for con-
structive criticism. Remaining blunders are my own.
1IrvingKravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Review of Economics and Statistics,
February 1956; and Wassily W. Leontief, "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade:
The American Capital Position Re-examined," reprinted in Readings in International
Economics, R. E. Caves and HG. Johnson (eds.), Homewood, Ill., 1968.
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higher wage rates than import competitors. The latter found that U. S.
trade is, on balance, labor using and, paradoxically, capital conserving.
Kravis gave no explanation for his results, which seem superficially to
contradict common views. Leontief, disturbed that the United States, a
capital-rich country, could disobey the famous Heckscher-Ohlin theorem,
offered a tentative rationalization. American labor, he suggested, is three
times as efficient as foreign labor, the difference being due to
neurship and superior organization," rather than cooperation with abun-
dant capital.2
Subsequent research inspired by these papers suggests that both
phenomena—high wages and relative labor intensity in U. S. export
industries—have a single cause: the substantial use of skill in U. S. export
industries or, in current parlance, the intensive use of human capital.
A recent paper by Helen Waehrer reproduces Kravis' work for
1960 and testsit for significance.3 She finds that twenty-two major
export industries pay a yearly wage of $5,649, while an equal number
of import competitors pay only $4,932. Further, there is a statistically
significant relationship between an industry's trade balance, B, and its
yearly wage, Taking all major trading industries together:
B = —18.48 + 0.003 W r=0.43
Waehrer goes on to ask why this is so, and generates two more signifi-
cant regressions that shed new light on Kravis' problem. Constructing an
occupational index, 1, to measure the fraction of each industry's labor
force employed in jobs that call for skill,5 she shows that:
r0.50
while
W = 1923.4 + 67.891r = 0.86
2Wassily W. Leontief, "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade." p. 525.
Helen Waehrer, "Wage Rates, Labor Skills, and United States Foreign Trade,"
in The Open Economy: Essays on Trade and Finance, P. B. Kenen
• and R. Lawrence (eds.), New York, 1968, especially pp. 23, 30 and 37. Waehrer's
paper derived from her dissertation (Columbia, 1966).
4 Waehrer's trade balance, B, is the difference between exports and imports,
divided by industry shipments. It differs from the index B, used later in this paper;
B, is divided by the suns of exports and imports.
5 Waehrer's skill index, I, is the sum of professional, managerial, clerical, sales and
service workers, and craftsmen and foremen, divided by total industry employment.SKILLS, HUMAN CAPiTAL, AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE197
An industry's skill mix, 1, gives a somewhat better statistical account of
its trade balance than does its yearly wage, and its skill mix goes a long
way to explain its wage rate. In Waehrer's view, Kravis' findings repre-
sent the role of skills in structuring our foreign trade, with wage rates
(strongly linked to skills) serving as a proxy for skill intensity.
Leontief himself took the first important step toward a systematic
explanation of his paradox. In a second article refining his results, he
classified total employment in export and import-competing production
according to occupation:6
Per cent of Total Labor Force
Export Import-Competing
Occupation Production Production
Professional, technical, etc. 13.75 12.24
Clerical, sales and service 22.07 17.00
Craftsmen and foremen 15.15 11.79
Operatives 30.05 28.38
Laborers 18.98 30.59
Translating these numbers into a crude estimate of the human capital
employed by the two sectors, one can say that American export produc-
tion is the more intensive in this species of investment. I have, in fact,
performed this particular translation, on the limiting assumption that
unskilled laborers have no human capital and that all wage differences
(the excess over laborer) are due to education and on-the-job training.
For all trading sectors (and all supplying sectors), I obtained these esti-
mates of the human capital used to manufacture 1947 trade:7
6 Wassily W. Leontief, "Factor Proportions and the Structure of American Trade:
Further Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economics and Statistics,
• November 1956, p. 399.
The results reported here are summarized in my "Nature, Capital and Trade,"
Journal of Political Economy, October 1965, PP. 456—58; for additional detail, see
B. Kenen and E. B. Yudjn, Skills, Human Capital and U.S. Foreign Trade, Inter-
national Economics Workshop, Columbia University, New York, 1965. The particular
figures cited in this table and the next derive from mean wage data (not medians),
were deflated by consumer prices (not hourly earnings), and related to all sectors
of the economy (Leontief's estimate A). Other computations, some less successful,
can be found in Kenen and Yudin, PP. 21—23 (and a separate analysis of direct
requirements is given on pp. 26—34).198EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
HumanCapital per Man Year
(thousandsof 1959 dollars)
1959Wage Differences Export Import-Competing
Capitalized at Production Production
9.0 percent 24.78 21.10
11.0 per cent 20.27 17.26
12.7 percent 17.56 14.95
Next, I have converted these statistics into 1947 dollars in order to
merge them with Leontief's statistics and generate a comprehensive
capital-to-labor ratio for each trading sector:8
Total Capital per Man Year
(thousandsof 1947 dollars)
1959Wage Differences Export Import-Competing
Capitalized at Production Production
9.0 per cent 30.61 29.83
11.0 per cent 27.16 26.89
12.7 per cent 25.08 25.12
In two of these three cases (and a handful of others), converting skills
data into human capital suffices to reverse the well-known paradox.9
Four other studies, using a variety of models and techniques, force-
fully emphasize the strategic role of skills. In an input-output study of
West German trade in 1954, Roskamp was surprised to find that German
exports were capital intensive, relative to those of the United States, even
though labor seemed then the abundant factor in West Germany.'° Re-
8This amalgamation invokes another limiting assumption concerning the long-run
fungibility of all forms of capital. It counts upon society's ability to choose deliber-
ately between investing in men and investing in things. The same supposition,
involving strong assertions about the efficiency of capital markets, underlies much
other work on human capital, especially comparisons of rates of return, and is the
explicit basis for my own elaborate model in "Nature, Capital and Trade."
One might still argue, however, that the paradox survives, for Leontief's compu-
* tationscontinue to imply that U.S. trade conserves tangible capital, and all evidence
suggests that the United States is well endowed with this form of capital. If, further,
one rejects the limiting assumption set forth in the preceding note, this counter-
argument acquires great strength.
10KarlW. Roskamp, "Factor Proportions and Foreign Trade: The Case of West
Germany," Weltwirtscha/tsliches Archly, No. 2, 1963.
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cently, however, Roskamp and McMeekin have taken a new look at
that same year's trade, using somewhat different methods and taking
explicit account of human capital.1' This reexamination had two results.
First, it revealed that, neglecting human capital, German exports were,
after all, more labor intensive than U. S. exports. Second, it found that
West German exports were quite intensive in human capital. In the
authors' own words, "... onehas to conclude that human capital was
the most abundant factor of production relative both to physical capital
and to labor. Labor was the abundant factor relative to physical capital
but not to human capital. Physical capital was the scarce factor of pro-
duction. When factors actually moved [internationally]it was human
capital which left the country and physical capital which flowed in. This
corroborates our findings."2
A second major contribution to this new subject is the series of
papers contributed by Keesing.'3 He has used U. S. "skill coefficients" to
measure the skills content of many countries' trade and has come forth
• with several striking results. Devising a list of occupations different from
• those used in other studies, Keesing ranks fourteen countries' exports
and imports according to the skills their trade flows would embody if all
countries' industries used skilled labor as do their U. S. counterparts.14
He then shows a powerful inverse correlation (a Spearman coefficient of
—0.87) between the skill content of exports and the skill content of
11 Karl W. Roskamp and Gorden C. McMeekin, "Factor Proportions, Human
Capital and Foreign Trade: The Case of West Germany Reconsidered," Quarterly
Journalof Economics, February 1968. The chief difference in method consists in
using factor incomes, rather than physical factor data, to measure factor use in
• each industry; this was done because "revenue streams emanating from assets,
capital or labor, determine how large those assets are" (p. 155).
12 Roskamp and McMeekin, "Factor Proportions, Human Capital and Foreign
Trade," p. 160.
13 Donald B. Keesing, "Labor Skills and International Trade: Measuring Many
Trade Flows with a Single Measuring Device," ReviewofEconomics and Statistics,
August 1965; "Labor Skills and Comparative Advantage," American Economic
Review, May 1966; and "Labor Skills and the Structure of Trade in Manufactures,"
• in The Open Economy, pp. 3—18. The summary furnished here draws mainly on
the last-named work.
• 14 Keesing ranks countries by means of an index which sums up scientists and
engineers, technicians and draftsmen, and other professionals, gives them double
weight, then adds machinists, electricians, and tool- and diemakers, and divides this
weighted total of "skilled workers" by the corresponding industry total of semi-
skilled and unskilled workers.
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imports; countries that "supply" large amounts of skill by way of their
exports "absorb" very little skill by way of their imports. Keesing goes
on to show that skill content of exports correlates impressively with
income per capita (a Spearrnan coefficient of 0.93), this despite the fact
that his study is confined to major industrial countries that do not dis-
• play huge income differences. Finally, Keesing demonstrates remarkable
consistency in the bilateral trade of the industrial countries; if a country
• exports skill-intensive goods to a trading partner, it is likely to import
less skill-intensive goods from that same trading partner. Working sepa-
rately with scientists and engineers, Keesing finds just two exceptions to
a strong ordering of pairwise trade patterns; working with machinists,
electricians, and tool- and diemakers, he finds only one exception.
Keesing's work is open to several objections,'5 and yields only
roundabout results on the role of skills. It does not link the factor con-
tent of a nation's trade directly to that nation's factor endowment, but
couples consistencyinnational rankings withthe Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem to infer differences in nations' skill supplies. Another cross-
national analysis, however, gives us direct evidence that the stock of
skills (or skill-generating power) shapes the production pattern within
• manufacturing and, therefore, affects a nation's foreign trade. Working
with data for twenty-six countries, including less-developed countries,
Yahr finds that certain industries pay high wages in all countries and,
with Waehrer, treats these as the industries using large amounts of skill.16
She then asks how large a part of each nation's output comes from these
same industries. Finally, she employs a schooling index (Harbison-Myers)
as a crude proxy for total skill supply (or the capacity to generate skill),
and asks if countries with high scores on the schooling index do, in fact,
specialize in skill-intensive products. Computing a separate cross-national
regression for each industry, she seeks to "explain" that industry's share
A in each nation's total output by that nation's schooling score. Her results
15See, e.g., Johnson's comments on "Labor Skills and Comparative Advantage,"
and A. 0. Krueger's comments following my paper.
16 Merle I. Yahr, "Human Capital and Factor Substitution in the CES Produc-
tion Function," in The Open Economy, pp. 9 1—97, especially Table 6. Yahr's paper
derives from her dissertation (Columbia, 1967). Her industries are composites of
two-digit ISIC groups. Two out of thirteen could not be classified consistently accord-
ing to relative wage (rubber products and nonmetallic mineral products); five others
were classified as high wage and the remaining six as low wage.
6SKILLS, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE201
are-impressive. In four out of five high-wage industries, the regression
coefficients are, as anticipated, positive and statistically significant (the
coefficients of determination range as high as 0.47). In five out of six
low-wage industries, the regression coefficients are, instead, negative and
statistically significant (the coefficients of determination range as high as
0.43)Qearly, countries with large amounts of skill specialize in indus-
tries needing much skill, while countries with limited amounts of skill
specialize in industries needing little skill.
Finally, let me mention one more result, tangentially related to this
general survey. In an early theoretical investigation of human capital and
foreign trade, I argued that standard Heckscher-Ohlin models do allow
for differences in incomes per capita, but seem to offer too few reasons
for those same differences. If all factor prices were equalized by trade,
there could be only two causes of differences in incomes: differences in
labor-force-participation rates and differences in over-all capital-to-labor
ratios. But models including investment in man introduce two more
causes of differences in incomes: differences in stocks of human capital
per worker and differences in the innate quality of labor (its "suscepti-
bility to improvement by investment").'8 Recent work by Krueger, using
an ingenious model, emphasizes the importance of these extra elements.
A very large portion of most income differences can be attributed to
measured differences in nations' stocks of human capital.19 In sixteen of
twenty-one countries studied, more than half the difference between U. S.
income and that of the other country is due to a shortfall in human
• capital. In no fewer than eight cases, moreover, the shortfall accounts for
more than three-fifths of the income difference.
17 The sole exception among high-wage industries was chemicals production
(including petroleum); the regression coefficient was negative but nonsignificant.
The sole exception among low-wage industries was wood manufacture (including
furniture); the regression coefficient was positive but nonsignificant. Yahr notes that
the coefficients of determination are in general lowest for industries with close ties
to natural-resource exploitation.
18 See "Nature, Capital and Trade," p. 451, and "Toward a More General Theory
of Capital and Trade," in TheOpen Economy,p. 118 and note 27.
19 Anne 0. Krueger, "Factor Endowments and Per Capita Income Differences
Among Countries," Economic Journal, September 1968, especially pp. 651—53.
Note Krueger's observation that her model understates accountable differences in
income insofar as measured income is understated for poor countries and insofar
as barriers to free trade prevent full factor-price equalization (pp. 651, 657).202EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Yet, some work on this subject leads to deep puzzlement. Bharadwaj
and Bhagwati have made human-capital estimates for India very similar
to those I have made for the United States.2° Measuring the skills em-
ployed by Indian exports and import substitutes, converting these to
human-capital equivalents, and adding their figures to tangible capital,
they find, as expected, that India's external trade is labor using and
human-cum-tangible capital saving, but, quite surprisingly, that the ad-
justment for human capital works to decrease, not increase, the relative
labor intensity of India's exports. The two authors offer several explana-
tions for this paradox and argue that more recent data might well resolve
it.2' But doubts and suppositions, however plausible, do not alter num-
bers, and these numbers do suggest that skills may not be all-important
for comparative advantage.
Consider, moreover, the quite different recent work of Keesing and
others, advancing a "dynamic" view of U. S. foreign trade. A pioneer in
research on the role of skills, Keesing has now supplied a second, corn-
• peting explanation for the behavior of U. S. exports. Spending on research
and development, he argues, explains U. S. success in foreign markets
better than any other variable tested, from which it is reasonable to con-
dude that "the world economic role of the United States involves the
systematic export of new products."22
20 Ranganath Bharadwaj and Jagdish Bhagwati, "Human Capital and the Pattern
of Foreign Trade: The Indian Case," Indian Economic Review, October 1967.
21 One, in particular, deserves complete quotation: "On the one hand, the weight
of plantations, mining and textiles in Indian exports, for our period, is very consid-
erable; and these sectors have a high percentage of 'skilled' workers. On the other
hand, the over.all skill content, in labour, in import competing activities such as
iron and steel and light engineering industries (many of which have a large base
in the small-scale sector in India) turn out to be lower; the growth of more complex
technology in these industries, involving perhaps greater over-all skill levels, must
O havecome in the period beyond that covered by our wage rates and occupational
data, which generally span the period 1955—1959" (pp. 139—40).
22Don,tjd B. Keesing, "The Impact of Research and Development on United
States Trade," in The Open Economy, pp. 175—89, and the several authors cited in
Keesing's first footnote (especially Hoffmeyer, Lary, Hufbauer, and Vernon). See,
too, William Gruber, D. Mehta and Raymond Vernon, "The R & D Factor in Inter-
national Trade and International Investment of United States Industries," Journal
of Political Economy, February 1967, and S. F. Kaliski's comment in the same
journal, October 1967.
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Keesing's chief evidence for this new view comprises a series of
simple correlations (using sixteen or more sectors) between the U. S.




Company R & D as a percentage of sales 0.59
Federal R & D as a percentage of sales 0.84
Total R & D as a percentage of sales 0.90
Scientists and engineers in R & D as a percentage
of the total labor force 0.91
Scientists and engineers outside R & D as a percentage
of the total labor force 0.67
Semi- and unskilled workers as a percentage of
the total labor forcec —0.59
Value added per establishment (standing for
plant economies of scale) 0.44
All data for 1960, save for value added per establishment (1958).
All but last significant at the 0.05 level.
Keesing gives simple correlations for two other skill groups ("other profes-
sionals" and "skilled manual workers") but does not aggregate his groups to test
the role of all skilled labor outside R & D. Hence, I reproduce his correlation for all
unskilled labor [as a proxy (with sign reversed) for skilled labor as a whole].
Clearly, expenditure on research and development and the corresponding
professional employment in R & D have the highest correlations with
export performance—higher than the correlations that relate to skills
per Se.
One observer has suggested that we need not choose between the
skills hypothesis and the R & D approach, as the former is static and the
latter is dynamic.23 The R & D approach, however, is not dynamic in any
conventional sense; it does not explain changes in the trade pattern.
Instead it has to be viewed as treadmill dynamic, explaining the trade
Edward J. Mitchell, "Explaining the International Pattern of Labor Productivity
and Wages: A Production Model with Two Labor Inputs," Review of Economics
and Statistics, November 1968, p. 467.
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pattern at each point in time by ongoing innovation.24 One is obliged to
make a choice between the two approaches.
ButKeesing'stests may not be the best basis for that choice. Note,
• first, that research input—employment or expenditure—is an imperfect
proxy for research output, and it is the latter that must govern export
shares.25 Moreover, it is not clear that one year's R & D is, alone, deci-
sive for export performance in another year, or that R & D undertaken
• in a single sector has its chief effects on the exports of that sector.26 Note,
finally, that Keesing reports high intercorrelations between several pairs
of his "independent" variables, so that the sequential use of R & D and
skills, in simple correlations with export performance, does not permit
the perfect ranking of competing suppositions.27
This last point has led me to augment his analysis by running and
reporting (in Appendix A) a series of multiple-regression relationships.
These do not resolve the most important difficulties inherent in testing
the R & D approach, but do help to clarify certain of the issues. Starting
with Keesing's own dependent variable, X4, the U. S. share in world
exports of ith sector output is:
=19.16—14.988K1,+ + 1.725S1,R2 =0.88
(2.850) (5.515)(1.728)
where represents the (direct) capital-to-output ratio for 1947, de-
rived from Leontief's original data; whereis Keesing's scientists and
engineers working in R & D; where S14 is Keesing's scientists and engi-
neers outside R & D (but recomputed as a fraction of the total labor force
24 If it were dynamic in conventional terms, the R & D approach might best be
tested by correlation R & D input (or output) with the change in export share (or
some "stock" of R & D with the share itself). One such test was performed in con-
nection with this paper and was unsuccessful; there is no correlation between sci-
entists and engineers in R & D (1960) and the change in export share (1962 to
1965). See Appendix A, Table 1. Note, however, one objection to this test (suggested
orally by Richard Nelson): The R & D approach postulates prompt imitation of
most innovations, so that old R & D grows obsolete very fast, and current or quite
recent R & D represents the whole stock relevant to export shares.
To make matters worse, available statistics on R & D are imperfect input
measures; the classification of scientists and engineers (between R & D and other
activities) is somewhat arbitrary, and one must also classify supporting personnel,
not (as here) treat all of them as production workers.
¶ more on this last point, see Keesing, "The Impact of Research and Develop-
ment," pp. 176—77.
27 For several of these correlations, see Appendix A, Table 3.SKILLS, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE205
outside R & D); and where the several numbers in parentheses are "t"
coefficients (not standard errors). In this and several other computations,
the argument representing research and development is, indeed, more
powerful than all others tried. The proxy for skills input, S14, and several
broader aggregates serving the same purpose did not attain statistical
significance (and did little to increase R2).
But when one employs a different measure of success in foreign
trade, the ith industry's trade balance, B1, one generates a very different
series of results:
B1 =23.94—87.782K11+ 2.656R1 + l6.020S11R2 =0.46
(2.168) (0.471) (2.084)
Keesing's proxy for research and development, R4, falls far short of sig-
nificance (and actually reduces R2), while S11 attains statistical signifi-
• cance. Further, a broader index of skill use (less closely correlated with
R1) gives a better explanation of the trade balance:
B, =— 14.51—97.097K1,+ 5.828R1 + 2.671S52R2 =0.60
(2.772) (1.579)(3.252)
where S51 includes scientists and engineers outside R & D, other profes-
sionals, and all skilled manual workers. Here, R4 comes closer to signifi-
cance (and helps slightly to increase R2), but the index of skill use,
does the most to explain trade-balance performance.
One is led, in the end, to choose Keesing on skills over the more
• recent Keesing on R & D, for when one looks at imports along with ex-
• ports (atinstead of Xe), skill use seems to be the more important
• variable.28 Research and development may still play a vital role in sus-
taining U. S. exports (which is all that Keesing claims) and may be quite
important in some other in
order. Yet Keesing's work on skills, with that of many others, appears
to open a more intriguing avenue for study, promising more general,
comprehensive explanations of the structure of production and compara-
tive advantage.
28 Notice, however, that this B equation has a lower coefficient of determination
than that obtained with X.
See, e.g., Ozawa's work relating transferred knowledge—research output—to
the rates of growth of Japanese exports. (Terutomo Ozawa, "Imitation, Innovation,
and Japanese Exports," in The Open Economy. pp. 190—212.)206 EDUCATIONAND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ANAGENDA FOR RESEARCH: POSITIVE ANALYSIS
THE several studies surveyed in the preceding section argue impressively
that skills or human capital are an important determinant of trade flows.
But this finding only serves to pose a series of questions that trade theo-
rists and others have yet to examine. Statements that countries well
endowed with skills will export skill-intensive products are no different
from and no more illuminating than statements that countries well
endowed with machines will tend to export machine-intensive goods.
The fixed-endowment factor box used in every trade course helps us to
describe national endowments and the two-way trade flows that endow-
ments generate, but it is inadequate for a long-run analysis. It does not
tell us how endowments come into being and why they should differ
between countries.
To carry the analysis one vital step further, one must ask why some
countries have acquired large supplies of skill and why others have
acquired large stocks of machinery. "In the dynamic case," Valivanis
argues, "the producible factors of production, given time, adjust pre-
cisely to the pattern of final demand. It makes no sense to speak of
'original endowments' unless one is speaking of the immediate short
run."3° This reminder gains new force when, as now, the labor force has
to be regarded as a producible factor of production. One might, perhaps,
adopt an intermediate view, supposing that financial capital and capital
• goods move across frontiers more readily than labor and that, irs conse-
quence, "the human resources of a country are subject to slower change
than its man-made material resources."3' This view, however, makes too
• much of a difference in degree to serve as the basis for general theorizing.
Furthermore, it faces factual challenge. Many skills can be imported via
foreign schooling and on-the-job training, and others can be borrowed by
hiring foreigners.32
When, instead, stocks of skill and capital equipment are viewed as
the end products of decisions to save and decisions to invest, an elemen-
30StephanValivanis, "Leontief's Scarce Factor Paradox," Journalof Po!iiical
Economy,December 1954, p. 524.
¶ 31 Keesing, "Labor Skills and the Structure of Trade in Manufactures." pp. 5—6.
32 On imported skills, see A. D. Scott's important paper in this conference volume;
on borrowed skills, see Elinor B. Yudin, "Americans Abroad: A Transfer of Capital."
in The Open Economy, pp. 40—69.
I
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taryanswer starts to take shape. High-income countries, capable of sav-
ing, are likely to accumulate all forms of capital—labor skills, machinery,
and disembodied knowledge. So, too, are those poorer countries, like
Japan, which appear to generate unusually large savings. Note, again,
Keesing's point that high-income Countries are the ones that export skill-
intensive products.33
But how are savings allocated—how much to training, to physical
plant, and to the development of new techniques? I lay claim to the first,
tentative reply. In two papers on this subject,34 I have tried to convert
conventional "point" theory, using the factor box, into "situation" theory,
using a species of factor-transformation curve. That curve shows how
savings should and will be allocated between the improvement of the
nation's labor force and the production of tangible capital. Its shape and
• size depend upon the savings rate and the innate quality of labor and
• land. The point chosen on the curve depends upon the interest rate and
prevailing factor prices (Valivanis' "pattern of final demand").
My approach is not without intriguing implications. It helps, for
instance, to explain the ACMS finding that "the American advantage in
efficiency tends to be least in capital-intensive industries,"35 and shows
33 But note that skill abundance, as reflected in trades flows, does not strongly
correlate with tangible-capital abundance; countries that export skill-intensive prod-
ucts seem also to conserve tangible capital. This point is implicit in Leontief's analy-
sis, is made again by Keesing ("The Impact of Research and Development," p. 181),
and is reaffirmed by my own multiple regressions (in which K1 and have nega-
tive weights, while S1and S5 have positive weights). It is, of course, possible that
skill-intensive processes are not also tangible-capital intensive, and this would make
for similar regression results, but there is little evidence to this effect. There is no
correlation, positive or negative, between the two measures of capital intensity and
the three measures of skill intensity in Appendii A, Table 3.
34 "Nature, Capital and Trade," pp. 442—49, and "Toward a More General
Theory of Capital and Trade," pp. 101—07.
a 35 The finding in question is in K. J. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas and
• R. M. Solow, "Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency," Review of
Economics and Statistics, August 1961, p. 247. My note on the problem, attributing
the bias to neglect of skills (labor augmentation), is "Efficiency Differences and
Factor Intensities in the CES Production Function," Journal of Political Economy,
December 1966, pp. 63 5—36.Recently, incidentally, Arrow, et a!., concede that
"there islittle to choose between neutrality [their first choice] and pure labor-
augmentation." See their reply, furnished by a protégé, to Gupta's comprehensive
treatment of the problem (Suraj B. Gupta, "Some Tests of the International Corn-
parisonsof Factor Efficiency with the CES Production Function," and Archen
Minsol, "Reply," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1968, pp. 470—80).
Minsol's university, Lower Slobbovia, would seem to have acquired a brilliant
economist!
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why international capital movements can occur even when free trade has
equalized all input prices.36 Yet I do not recommend much more work
along these lines. First, my own approach relies on the existence of
diminishing returns to capital formation in man and land (the latter
representing all tangible assets). This is far from realistic,if not with
respect to man, surely with respect to land. Second, my approach leaves
no room for direct use of simple, unskilled labor and, therefore, loses
touch with much of the research summarized above, dealing with dif-
ferences in the skill requirements of various activities and related trade
flows. Third, my approach gives no place to the production of pure
disembodiedknowledge—researchanddevelopment—althoughthis
species of investment seems to play a role in the explanation of U. S.
exports.
Future work on human capital and foreign trade must surely answer
the same questions studied in my model, but should now be focused less
abstractly on two basic issues: (1) How does human capital enter the
production function? (2) Why do certain countries seem to have an edge
in the acquisition of human capital? Taken together, answers to these
questions would lead us to modify factor-endowments theory and furnish
an incisive analysis of foreign trade, especially of trade in manufactured
products.
Trade theorists would be quite pleased if other economists were to
reply to the first question; we do not care to poach on colleagues' pre-
serves. But we cannot refine our own methods without knowing more
about the links between skilled and unskilled labor and their relationship
to physical capital. Are we now to use three-factor production functions,
allowing for the joint employment of both types of labor? If so, should
we treat the two as far from perfect substitutes? This view is endorsed by
Mitchell and is the rationale for most of Keesing's computations on skill
• requirements.37 Alternatively, should we use simple labor augmentation?
36 "Nature, Capital and Trade,"pp.45 1—55,and "Toward a More General Theory
• of Capital and Trade," pp. 118—23.
37 See Mitchell, "Explaining the International Pattern of Labor Productivity and
u Wages," especially pp. 466—68, and Keesing, "Labor Skills and the Structure of
Trade in Manufactures," Pp. 8—9. Others would appear to take a similar position,
including Roskamp and McMeekin, Krueger, Waehrer, and Yahr, all cited pre-
viously. (Yahr's work on factor substitution, however, may fit more neatly into a
labor-augmentation model; sec pp. 70—85).
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This view seems to have Griliches' support (see his paper in this volume)
and was the explicit basis for my own theorizing.38 If, finally, we are told
that labor augmentation makes the most sense, how should we then inter-
pret Keesing's computations, based as they are on fixed skill require-
ments?39 Trade theorists are frequent lenders of technique. This time,
we must be net borrowers of knowledge, and are likely to display strong
preference for present over future goods or, at least, for quick service
from the rest of the profession.
Meanwhile, we must deal with the second question—the reasons for
differences in stocks of human capital. Here, then, are three conjectures,
each of which may help explain the apparent concentration of human
capital in a small handful of high-income countries:
I.SCHOOLING AND TRAINING MAY BE SUBJECT TO INCREASING
RETURNS.
This conjecture is derived from two other suppositions. First, there
are obvious economies of scale in formal education (measured in quan-
tity and quality of output): large institutions can employ expensive,
• indivisible physical equipment and can gather staff in numbers that per-
mit advanced, specialized instruction. Second, as countries accumulate
skills, they may well encounter diminishing returns to the useofskills in
manufacturing, so that the diversion of skilled workers to the supervision
of on-the-job training makes for a smaller absolute sacrifice of current
output than would be the case in countries with small stocks of skill.
II. THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF OBTAINING SKILL MAY DECREASE
AS INCOME RISES.
This conjecture is derived from the further supposition that the
marginal utility of current consumption does, in fact, decline and is, in
38is likewise consistent with my computations amending Leontief (and may
also be consistent with Krueger's work on income, even though her model is cast
in multifactor form).
One could, of course, treat Keesing's skill-mix computations as proxies for dif-
ferences in degrees of augmentation or, more precisely, as measures of (augmented)
labor intensities (which must differ systematically across sectors for the strong factor
ordering required by factor-endowments analysis).
I
•-
—- —F210EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
any case, quite high when income nears subsistence.4° Put less contro-
versially, personal savings and discretionary spending are, together, very
small at prevailing income levels in many countries, so that too many
youngsters and adults cannot pay the costs of training (whether tuition
fees or foregone earnings).4'
HI. IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS TEND TO DIVERT SAVINGS
TOWARD TANGIBLE CAPITAL, AND IMPERFECTIONS ARE SEVERE
IN ALL BUT A FEW MARKETS.
This conjecture does not call for much elaboration. Few observers
would deny that capital markets are underdeveloped in a surprising num-
ber of countries (and even those that are developed have only recently
begun explicitly to finance personal investments in formal education).
Furthermore, imperfect capital markets tend to favor short-term lending
against very visible, salable collateral.(In most countries, of course,
formal education is financed by the state, not from private savings, but
even here, differences in levels of development may correlate with biases
against human capital. Less-developed countries are notorious for spend-
ing public funds on tangible symbols of economic sovereignty.)
Putting these conjectures into different form, the first suggests that
the supply curve of training shifts out with rising income; the second
suggests that the demand curve moves in the same direction; and the
40 Note, however, Krueger's point (in her comment on this paper) that training
to high skill levels may involve large opportunity costs to the individual and society.
since those who receive this training are already skilled and forego high incomes to
obtain more skill.
41 This point applies to formal schooling and general training, since specific train-
ing is financed by employers. In fact, however, most of the skills employed in the
poorer countries are probably low-level manual skills (and the markets for them
are sufficiently competitive to treat them as general). Precisely because professional
skills are in such short supply, production is patterned toward low-skill processes.
On specific and general skills, see Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, New York, NBER,
1964, pp. 11—29. On manual and professional skills, see Keesing, "Labor Skills and
the Structure of Trade in Manufactures," pp. 9—10, where he asserts that certain
manual skills are "ubiquitously required in every manufacturing industry," and are,
therefore, general in Becker's sense.
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third conjecture reinforces the second. If one or more of them is true,
human-capital formation is quite likely to proceed faster, absolutely and
compared to other forms of investment, in high-income countries. If, fur-
ther, this prediction is combined with the chief inference from Krueger's
work—that human capital adds mightily to real income—one is brought
to forecast the continuing concentration of human capital in the wealthy
countries, with a corresponding concentration on those activities making
intensive use of high-level skills.
Consider, finally, one more topic for investigation.Distinctions
among types of skill may help to explain the sequence and migration of
industrial development over long periods and the corresponding evolution
of foreign trade. If a particular level or type of skill is used by a particu-
lar technology or subset of activities, a country pioneering in that tech-
nology may well acquire a comparative advantage in all the activities
using that technology. In effect, a "leading" industry using that technol-
ogy can furnish the "followers" with a low-cost input (or with the trained
workers they will need as teachers). Put differently, the skills employed
by a technology will be more or less specific to the leading industry—
the first to be developed—and training costs will be borne by the first
firms, but the same skills will be general for subsequent users of the same
technology, and further training costs will be borne by workers. Yet a
country that accumulates one level or type of skill may have no particu-
lar comparative advantage in other industries or upon the advent of a
new technology. It is as likely to lag as lead in the development of those
• other industries or in the exploitation of the new technology.
More concretely, could one show that the international migration
of the industrial revolution from Britain to the Continent and the United
States was related to differences between the skill requirements of the
"leading" product groups in its successive phases, first textiles, then
metals, then motorcars, chemicals and electrical equipment? As human-
• capital endowments may well change more slowly than physical endow-
ments, inherited differences in skill supplies may have been more important
• in governing the pace and locus of development than inherited differ-
ences in stocks of machinery. Could one also show that the migration
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ers,serving as temporary teachers, is strategic to the further spread of
industrialization? The Japanese example may be a leading case in
Lastly,could one show that the well-documented tendency toward a
more sophisticated specialization among industrial countries—the ten-
dency toward larger two-way trade flows inside product groups—reflects
the very specialized technologies and, therefore, specific skill require-
ments of the newer manufactures?43 By doing so, one would attach a
• new operational significance to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, especially
if one could show why one country has a comparative advantage in pro-
ducing the techniques and the labor skills connected with its own differ-
entiated exports.
AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH: NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS
MUCH of our research on human capital has been inspired by nor-
mative concerns, not mere curiosity. Are we investing enough in educa-
tion? Are the several outputs of our schools well matched to the needs
of our economy? Are we using the right input mix—teachers and pro-
fessors, buildings and equipment—in the production of knowledge and
skills? The bulk of the research called forth by these questions is, quite
rightly, positive; one must have facts before one can give advice. Yet I
should like to make a new plea for theoretical and normative investi-
• gations, and to ask that those investigations span a wider range of ques-
tions than the one to which research has already been addressed. There
are, in particular, some problems in trade theory that acquire new dimen-
sions when one takes account of skills.
42See, again, Ozawa, "Imitation, Innovation, and Japanese Exports," and Yudin,
"Americans Abroad." My comments here constitute a modified version of the
• familiar "late-corner" hypothesis, stressing the late.comer's exploitation of the
leader's assets, not his mistakes. Incidentally, the importance of skilled labor to f
development was well known to the mercantilists centuries ago. Colbert's decrees,
for example, offered large bounties to lure master craftsmen from Flanders to France.
For evidence on intraindustry trade and further thoughts on its causes, see
Bela Balassa, "Tariff Reductions and Trade in Manufactures among the Industrial
Countries," American Economic Review, June 1966, and his Trade Liberalization
among Industrial Countries, New York, 1967, pp. 86—94.
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The Costs and benefits of training would seem to provide the most
compelling case for infant-industry protection. The accumulation of
human capital has two important aspects. First,it absorbs resources.
Manpower and materials are consumed by education and by other forms
of training, and there is an output loss (the counterpart of income lost
by the students and trainees). Second, education is a time-consuming
process. Most manual skills can, perhaps, be learned quite quickly, but
professional and managerial skills are imparted very slowly; these involve
continuous learning-by-doing over a large fraction of one's working life.
Taken in tandem, these two aspects of the process justify temporary
tariffs or subsidies for skill-using industries during the early stages of
development. Protection may be most potent in fostering the acquisition
of specific skills (as the training costs involved are borne by the firm,
and the quite specific managerial skills which seem often to be scarcest
take much time to acquire). But tariffs or subsidies may also be needed
to promote investments in general training, as personal incomes are quite
low and capital markets are imperfect in the less-developed countries, so
that firms may be unable to shift any training costs onto their apprentices"
In some cases, however, the gains from investment in human capital
may justify permanent tariff protection for import-competing skill-using
industries. Protection could increase the demand for skills, encouraging
additional investment in training and raising real income. This possibility
is explored in a two-sector model outlined in Appendix B. The model
displays most of the properties of standard Heckscher-Ohlin constructs,
but seeks to make explicit—if primitive—allowance for the costs and
benefits of using skilled labor.
One sector of the two-sector economy produces and exports a pri-
mary commodity, using unskilled labor and embodied capital (perma-
nent improvements in natural land). The second sector manufactures an
import-competing consumer good, using skilled labor and imported
machines. Skilled workers earn a higher wage and are trained by sacri-
ficing current manufactured output (in a fixed amount per newly trained
worker); skilled workers never die and machines do not depreciate.
44 An analogousargumentis made by Steffan Linder, (An Essay on Trade and
Transformation, Stockholm, 1961, pp. 27—28).
-
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Investmentsin skill are governed by rational calculations; future earnings
due to skill are discounted at the market rate of interest and their present
value equated to the cost of training. But because training costs are
measured in consumer goods and these are subject to a tariff, investments
in skill may be valued in two ways. The consumer goods absorbed by
training have a social cost (their world price) and a private cost (their
tariff-distorted domestic price). One's impulse is always to opt for social
cost, all the more so in this instance, because the social cost is lower,
making for additional investments in skill. But this impulse may be harm-
ful. One has also to remember that the marginal product of skilled labor
is distorted by the tariff on the skill-intensive good. We enter the unhappy
world of the second best!
To roundout the model, savings and tax revenues (from tariffs and
income taxes) are used jointly to finance all forms of investment—fur-
ther permanent improvements in the land, imports of additional machines,
and the education of more skilled workers. Imports of consumer goods
and machines are exactly equal to primary exports (a result which may
depend on the exchange rate, though this rate does not appear directly
• in the model, because all prices are defined in foreign currency).
When set out most compactly (equations 2.1—2.14), the model still
contains twenty-two variables, eight of them exogenous and fourteen
endogenous. It is much too large for complete analysis. I have, therefore,
extracted a subset of equations (the matrix 2.16) to analyze partially the
role of the tariff, t,unittraining costs, g, and growth in the labor force.
This partial analysis has as its chief defect that it fixes net investment
(by fixing the sum of savings and tax revenues) and the allocation of
investment between the two sectors (by fixing the difference between total
exports and consumer-destined imports). Note, however, that it does not
fix the distribution of investment between machines and skills used in
manufacturing. The partial analysis summarized below examines the
effects of changes in tandg on the equilibrium position of the system
and on the equilibrium growth rates of the skilled labor force and net
national product.
Taking first the impact on the stock of skills (equation 2.18), an
increase in the tariff on manufactures reduces, once and for all, the stock
of skills, rather than increasing it, but has no direct effect on the rates of
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growth derived from population change and capital formation.45 Further-
more, the mode of valuation of human capital (at social or private cost)
makes no difference whatsoever at this juncture. Finally, an increase in
unit training costs has no direct effect on the stock of skills, but does slow
down the rates of growth attached to population change and capital
formation.
Turning next to the effects on real income (valued at world prices),
one encounters strange results (equation 2.19). If one asks what will
happen when a tariff is imposed (not when an existing tariff is raised)
and when human capital is valued at social cost, the answer is clear: real
income will fall. If, instead, one asks about an increase in a tariff, the
answer is not clear: real income will not fall so much and, indeed, may
increase if the tariff rate and return to skill are quite high to start.
Further, when human capital is valued at private cost, the argument
• grows more complex, since two new terms appear in the relevant coeffi-
cient, each with a different sign. One can say that valuation at private
cost reduces the income loss consequent upon the introduction of a tariff
(for one of the two terms drops out again), but one cannot evaluate the
cost of change in a preexisting tariff.
To make matters worse, a tariff change has complex direct effects
on the real growth rates attached to population change and to capital
formation.4° When human capital is valued at social cost, an increase in
the tariff on manufactures will decrease the growth rate of real income
caused by population change, wifi increase the growth rate caused by
net investment in export production, and will decrease the growth rate
caused by net investment in manufacturing (including net investment in
human capital). Its over-all effect, of course, depends on the relation-
ships among population growth and the two investment flows. When
• human capital is valued at private cost, the outcome is less certain. By
way of illustration, consider the effects of an increase in the tariff, t, on
the growth of real income due to population change: If 1> 1, an increase
This result is diametrically opposed to my initial supposition. But note the sev-
eral caveatsinfootnotes 52 and 54.
46 The word "direct" is meant to warn that the results reported here exclude
effects of tariff change on several of the variables entering the argument of equa-
tion 2.19. This is a second sense in which Appendix B constitutes an incomplete,
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in t will cause an even larger decrease in the growth rate. If t =1,the
two modes of valuation have identical (retarding) effects. But if z < 1,
the outcome depends on the relationship between t and the wage differ-
ential due to skill, denoted by w:
a.When (w— 1)< i(1 + w),anincrease in twill be adverse to
growth in real income.
b.When (w— 1)=z(1 + w),anincrease in t will have no effect
on growth in real income.
c. When (w— 1)> 1(1 + w),anincrease in t will actually pro-
mote growth in real income.47
One could perhaps refine all of these results, thereby explaining the
source of their complexity. One could also generate additional results,
pertaining to the consequence of higher training costs and to the effects
of changes mt and g on other Most importantly, one should
continue the search for a firm answer to the basic question: What is the
precise interaction betweentariffrates, wage differentials, and the
real costs of training? This was the question with which I began, but I
have not answered it in this account or in the appendixes.
APPENDIX A
THE data on skills and U. S. foreign trade used in the body of this paper
are taken from Keesing,49 and United Nations publications.
Note the clearer implication of these findings for the imposition of a tariff
(when =0to start). If w< 1,the introduction of atariffwill reduce the growth
rate due to population change; if w= 1,it will have no effect; and if w> 1,it will
raisethe growth rate.
48have found that an increase in training costs (expenditure per worker) will
raise real output, but have not tried to analyze its direct effect on the rates of growth
of output linked to population change and the two investment flows. The task is not
easy, and I doubt that much more effort should, in fact, be lavished on the partial
model used in Appendix B.
Donald B. Keesing, "The Impact of Research and Development on United
States Trade," in TheOpen Economy, P.B. Kenen and R. Lawrence (eds.), New
York, 1968.
W. Leontief, "Factor Proportions and the Structure of American Trade:
Further TheoreticaL and Empirical Analysis," ReviewofEconomicsand Statistics.
November,1956.
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Precise definitions follow:
U. S. exports of ith industry output, expressed as a percentage of
Group-of-Ten ith industry exports, 1962.
G4The over-all percentage change in X4 from 1962 through 1965.
B4U. S. exports of ith industry output less U. S. imports of ith indus-
try output expressed as a percentage of their sum, 1961.
R4Scientists and engineers engaged in research and development,
expressed as a percentage of total ith industry employment, 1960.
S1.Scientists and engineers not engaged in research and development,
expressed as a percentage of adjusted ith industry employment,
1960 (adjusted employment being total employment less scientists
and engineers engaged in research and development).
524Other professionals, expressed as a percentage of adjusted ith in-
dustry employment, 1960.
S34Skilled manual workers, expressed as a percentage of adjusted ith
• industry employment, 1960.
• S44The sum ofand S24.
S54The sum of S14, 524,andS34.
K14Direct capital requirements per dollar of ith industry output, 1947.
• . K24Direct plus indirect capital requirements per dollar of ith industry
output, 1947.
The trade data used for X4, G4 and B4 derive directly from Keesing's
paper and from Commodity Trade Statistics. The skills data used for R4
and forthrough S54 also come from Keesing's paper, but Sit, S24 and
534 have been redefined to exclude from the labor-force denominator
scientists and engineers engaged in research and development. The capi-
tal coefficients K14 and K24 are export-weighted averages of the coeffi-
cients given by Leontief. (As these weights and coefficients pertain to
1947, they are not well matched with the trade and skills data for
1960—62, but should not be wholly irrelevant.)
The eighteen industries studied here are those used by Keesing and
account for the bulk of manufactured exports. The chief exclusions are
atomic energy devices, communications equipment and electronic com-




Simple Correlations Between Trade Indexes and Input Indexes






















asignhficantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.
TABLE 2
Simple Correlations Between Trade Indexes
B, G,
xi 1.0000 — —
B1 06793a 1.0000 —
G, 0.0918 0.3616 1.0000
asignificantly different fromzero at the 0.05 level.
TABLE 3
Simple Correlations Between Trade Indexes
R, S5, K2,
R1 1.0000 — — — — —
S11 0•7092a 1.0000 — — — —
S4, 07536a09295a 1.0000 — — —
s5, 0.4108 06018a 05049a1.0000 — —
K1,—0.1528 0.1271 0.0084 0.23841.0000 —
K21—0.3972 0.0044 —0.1968 0. 122407552a1.0000SKILLS. HUMAN CAPITAL,AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE219
TABLE 4
Multiple Regression Equations Using K11
I —
Trade
Index Regression Coefficients on InputIndexesa

































B1 =34.73— 59.267K11 + 11.387R1
(1.406) (2.731)
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aNumbers in parenthesesare "t" coefficients, not standard errors.
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B1 37.54 —19.586K21 + 10.315 R1
(1.076) (2.241)
0.31
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Table1 sets out simple correlations betweenG andand the
several measures of research input, skill use, and capital intensity. Table
2 sets out simple correlations between the three trade indexes themselves.
Table 3 sets out simple correlations between and
K24.Table4 supplies a comprehensive set of multiple regressions "ex-
plaining" and B4.Table5 supplies a similar series using K24instead
of K14.
APPENDIXB
THE model set out here describes a two-sector economy operating
under pure competition, with constant returns to scale, and trading with
the outside world. The first of its two sectors produces a primary com-
modity, A,usingunskilled labor, La, and a stock of capital, Ka,which
does not depreciate and can be augmented by sacrificing current produc-
tion of A.Byimplication, K,,ismeasured in A, its rate of change is
nonnegative, and K,, is exogenous (representing irretrievable investments




where Pa iS the world price of A and W,,thewage of unskilled labor
(each of them expressed in foreign currency), and risthe rate of interest.
The second sector manufactures a consumer good, C,usingskilled
labor, L,,,anda stock of capital, consistingof imported machines
that do not depreciate. By implication, used machines can be exported
without discount, the rate of change of the stock can be negative, and
isnot exogenous (being susceptible of instant adjustment). In the second
sector, then:
C (1.4)
p(l + — =Wa=(l (1.5)
Pc(l + = (1.6)
where po is the exogenous world price of C,Pkthe exogenous world price222 EDUCATIONAND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ofa machine, and w8 the wage of skilled labor (each of them expressed
in foreign currency), where w is (w8 — thewage differential due
to skill, and t is the ad valorem tariff on C.
The skills used in this second sector are created by sacrificing cur-
rent production of C at a fixed rate, g, per skilled worker. Skill, like
other stocks, does not depreciate (workers do not die). By implication,
L0*, the total stock of skills, has attributes similar to those of K5; its rate
of change is nonnegative, and itself is Investments in
skill are governed by rational cost-benefit calculations of the ordinary
sort. In consequence:
w.waw.wa
g + ni) =
(1 + r
(1.7)
where ii. = 0 if investments in skill are valued at social cost, and n =
if they are valued at private (tariff-distorted) cost. All skilled labor is
employed in manufacturing—none of it is left to do the work of unskilled
workers—and the whole labor force is fully employed. Formally:
Lis the whole labor force. Next, define gross (and net) national
product, using the price of the exportable as numeraire and counting out-
put sacrificed to capital formation.52 At domestic prices:
• YdA+ + t)C (1.10)
and at world prices:
= A +(pc/pa)C (1.11)
One could, of course, reduce L,IL (where L is the whole labor force) if L itself
were growing, and this is how I shall interpret certain subsequent results. To put
the same point in a general context; formulae that describe changes in the stock of
skills or real income consequent on changes in tariffs or training costs must be
viewed as pertaining to once-over movements between equilibria, accomplished by
departing from the rates of growth associated with those equilibria. Formulae that
describe changes in rates of growth must be viewed as pertaining to once-over
changes in the equilibrium rates themselves.
52 This sort of accpunting will be valid provided the outputs in question (measured
by and are included in the definition of investment.
..
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Further, define gross (and net) investment, including additions to K, and
to Lc*:
I= + +(pc/p,X1 + t)gLc* (1.12)
where dotted terms denote percentage rates of change. Tax revenues con-
sist of tariff proceeds and of an income tax levied at a fixed rate, y. Savings
are a fraction, s, of after-tax income. Continuing to useas numeraire:
T(Pc/Pa)t Cm + yYd (1.13)
S=s(l—y)Yd (1.14)
where Cm are imports of the manufactured good. Total imports are Cm
plus the machinery used to manufacture C. Using the same numeraire:
M = (pe/po)Cm + (1.15)
Furthermore:
Cm = C (1.16)
where C. is final domestic demand, a function of relative prices and total
private spending:
C. = + 0, (1 —yXI—s)Ydl (1.17)
Export demand, in turn, depends on the relative price of the primary
product:
X = A, = A[(pa/pc), (1.18, 1.19)
whereimpounds all exogenous elements affecting export demand.
Finally, assume that foreign trade is always balanced and that all govern-
ment spending is for capital formation. These assumptions give:
X=M (1.20)
I=S+T (1.21)
The system set out here can be rendered more compact and, in the
end, determinate. Combine equations (1.1), (1.4), (1.9), (1.10), (1.1 1), (1.17)
and (1.19) into five equations using the ten variables L,, L, Yd,
Y,,,,A,, Ra [for Ka/La],[for and q. [for Pc/Pa], and the four
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L0 + L (2.1)
=+ t (2.2)
Yw=fa(Ra, l)La+qcfc(Rc, (2.3)
Ce = + t), (1 —y—s')YdJ (2.4)
A, = (2.5)
Then combine the rest of the original equations into five more, using the
six additional variables w, Ra, and[for Pk/Pc], and the remain-
ing parameters, g and n:
/1 + w\rfa(Ra,1)—Ra'fa'l
ii (2.6)
\ 1 -1- t 1) —.j'J
(1+ tXf,'/fa') = (2.7)
/w\
= I) — (2.8) 1+: l+w
K0. L0 + qc(g+ RC)LC* .+ Ka R0 + KC)RC =(2.9)
+ qkRC)LC* .+qc(qkKC)RC=J2 (2.10)
where J1 = qe(Cc —C):+ (y + s')Yd,netrevenues plus savings; where
.12 = A, — —C),the difference between total exports and imports
of consumer goods; and where, by additional assumption, A, > —C)
> Finally, differentiate (2.1), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) to form four more
equations using the six additional variables L, w, qk, q6, g and 1, and
determining the sector allocation of investment and of any increase in
the total labor force:
a, 53 variable C appears inand 12, but does not count among the endogenous
variables entering this compact version. Here and hereafter, C and A are used in
place of the more cumbersome functions and /,(R,, l)L,, whenever con-
venience will not be misleading. Notice, in passing, that—/2= KeL, + KeR. =
• KeK., investment in primary production, and this is'nonnegative. Notice, further,
that subsequent procedures in whichand 12 are held constant imply an arbitrary
allocation of fixed tax revenues and savings between primary production, on the one
hand, and skills plus machines, on the other. It is of course possible to fix these two
• terms, despite changing incomes, exports, imports, prices, and tariffs; one could
change the tax rate, y, to stabilizeand one could impose export taxes or export
subsidies to manipulate A, and stabilize /2 (while altering y again to offset the fiscal
consequences for Jr). But a constant allocation of tax revenues and savings may not
be optimal (and may, indeed, be inconsistent with some equilibria). This is the
major
defect of the method I adopt below.
J
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(2.11)
[Akk(pO/wO)r. Ra}Ra —[Ckk(Pa/Wa)(1 RC]RC




where Akk = —fg"(Ra/fa')and Ckk =— andeachmay be
deemed positive.
This second version of the model has twenty-two variables, but
eight of these should be regarded as exogenous: the size and rate of
change of the total labor force (L and L); the size and rate of change
of the import price ratio (4k and the stocks and KG, representing
investments brought forward from the past; and changes in the tariff and
in Unit training costs (1and Thereare, then, fourteen endogenous
variables and the same number of equations.
I seek now to ascertain the principal effects of changes in the tariff
and in unit training costs. To do so totally, however, would be quite diffi-
cult, requiring the simultaneous solution of fourteen equations. Hence,
• I shall develop partial answers, neglecting all changes inand and
concentrating on two questions:
1.What are the effects of changes in g or t on the equilibrium
position of the system, especially upon the stock of skills and upon
national income at world prices?
2. What are the effects of changes in g or t on the equilibrium rates
of growth of andwhen and if the system has attained the equi-
librium position implied by a new g or t? To answer these two questions,
54Forcaveatsconcerningthis procedure, see notes 51 and 53.
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one hasfirstto use equation (2.3) to define the rate of change of national
income:
YwYw =A'La + .Uk0 Rr
+(qc' (2.15)
Notice, however, that equations (2.9) through (2.14) contain the same
five variables that affectand that there is only one other endogenous
variable, inthat subset of equations. In consequence, one can attach
(2.15) to that six-equation subset, then use this central portion of the
whole system to answer the questions just posed. First, set (pa/wa)
=1,by an appropriate choice of the relevant physical units. Then
removefrom(2.15), using the arguments of (2.12). Finally, add
(2.13) to (2.14) to simplify the latter, and subtract (2.10) from (2.8)












Thissystem has a simple, nonsingular determinant:
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It also supplies straightforward solutions for changes in the stock of skills
and national income. Solving first for
=(Rc/Q){La[— + (L.Akk)L+
(2.18)
where Q=—/D/> 0,while H = Ckk)J2— AkkXJ1
—
An increase in the tariff,t, reduces the equilibrium level of
(slowing or halting investment in human capital until the economy has
achieved the requisite reduction in Further, the mode of valuation
of human capital, whether at social or private cost, has no effect on the
influence of changes in the tariff; the termfl( 1_-f-__)in(2.16) does not
appear in (2.18). Finally, an increase in 4k—in the price of the machinery
used to manufacture C relative to that of C itself—augments the equilib-
rium value of
• V - Consider,next, two continuing effects—population growth, denoted
• by L, and gross investment, denoted by —.12)and J2. Clearly, popula-
tion growth raises Notice, moreover, that the tariff rate does not
appear in Qorin any other part of the coefficient attaching to L. Once,
then, the economy has attained the equilibrium implied by a new tariff
.)
rate,that rate has no direct effect on the allocation of subsequent additions
to the total labor force.5° But changes in training costs do havea direct
effect; as g appears in Q,anincrease in unit training costs will shunt a
larger share of additional labor into primary production. The joint effects
of investment, denoted by H, cannot reduce the stock of skill, but the
separate effects of —.12),investment in primary production, and of J2,
• investment in manufacturing, have unambiguously opposite signs. The
former tends to reduce Lc*; the latter tends to raise it. In each case, more-
over, the tariff rate does not affect the impact of investment, but higher
• training costs, increasing Q,diminishthe influence of both forms of
investment.
The sign attached to H derives from the fact that —12)and 12 are con-
tinuing processes, not single acts like t or j, and haye continuing effects on L,,
regardless of the size of L. But is nonnegative, so H must be nonnegative.
56 tariff, however, wilL influence the equilibrium values of R,, L, and L,*
(appearing in R,/Q) and will then have an indirect effect on the allocation of addi-
tional labor.
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Now solve (2.16) for the rate of change of real income valued at
world prices:
(±-)3 [C(r. (Kc/Ckk)V —(1
+[w.C]1





where V = (C/Q)[w + — .and V> 0 if> R0 (the
It\r
familiarstrong factor-intensity assumption); where W
=+J[l —
(-___)],
and W> 0 if < 1; and where Z = [1 + (g +
r i
—(I/QXK.AicijWj + + +
i
1 +
+ (g + so that [1 + (g + Z> 0.
The first three arguments of (2.19) pertain to the effects of once-over
changes (4k,andonthe equilibrium level of income. Unfortunately,
two of them are ambiguous, even after one invokes strong factor ordering
(to set V> 0). One can say that an increase in expenditure on train-
ing (1>0)causes a permanent increase in income (and that the influ-
ence of changes in training costs is not directly dependent on the tariff
p rate or the mode of valuation of human capital). But one cannot know
• the impact of changes inor t.
If human capital is valued at social cost (n = 0), the second portion
• of the tariff coefficient has to be positive. If, further, t = 0 to start, Z will
exceed unity (as W is zero). The introduction of a tariff will reduce
If t > 0 to start, however, Zcouldbe less than unity, diminishing the
adverse impact of a higher tariff. If human capital is valued at private
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to start, this mode of valuation activates the final term in the tariff coeffi-
cient, working to reduce, if not to reverse, the impact of the tariff change.
When t= 0to start, then, the introduction of a tariff could increase real
income (and is the more likely to do so, the larger the wage difference
earned by skill). When t > 0, however, W reappears, reducing Z, and
the net effect of a higher tariff is again in doubt.57
The last three terms of (2.19) relate to the effects of population
growth and the two forms of investment. Once more, however, two of
them have uncertain signs. An increase of the labor force (L > 0) raises
real income, but the fixed pattern of investment denoted by —12)
and12 could work to reduce it.58
Consider, next, the impact of the tariff rate on the rates of change
of income associated with L and with investment.be Neglecting indirect
effects (those on L0, L0, K0, K0, w, and r):





If, then, human capital is valued at social cost (n0), an increase in
the tariff rate will lower theinduced by L (but cannot turn it negative).
If human capital is valued at private cost (n =1),an increase in the tariff
may have different consequences:
a.If t> 1, an increase in t will be even more adverse to growth in
income due to growth in population;
b. Ift= 1,anincreaseintwillhavethesameeffectaswhenn=O;
c.If: < 1, there are three possibilities:
(i)With (w —1)< t( 1 + w), an increase in I will be adverse
to growth in income;
4
Notice, however, that W declines as w rises, SO that, with high returns to skill,
the whole coefficient could be positive.
58The uncertain signs of the coefficients multiplying (11 —12)and 12 themselves
may well derive from the fact that fixed rates of investment will not always maximize
growth in real income.
Changes in training costs are equally significant for the population and invest-
ment coefficients, but their effects are more difficult to analyze (and the partial
analysis used thus far is even less appropriate).
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(ii)With (w —1)= t( 1 + w), an increase in I will not affect
growth in income; and
(iii)With (w —1)> t(l + w), an increase in twill actually pro-
mote growth in income due to growth in population.
Turning, finally, to investment, when n = 0, the argument multiply-
ing —12)rises with a higher tariff. Investment in primary production
will make a larger contribution to Yb,. This is because the higher tariff
raises W, reducing Z (see equation 2.21). When n = 1, however, one
must go through all the cases listed above, turning them around. In case
c(i), for instance, an increase intwill reduce the contribution of
—12);the positive derivative of —Z will be reduced, so that the whole
coefficient multiplying net investment will not rise as much. Again, when
n = 0,theargument attached to J2 alone is decreased by a higher tariff,
/ 1\
for r ( 1 will fall and W will rise. Investment in manufacturing,
including human capital, will make a smaller contribution to When
n = 1, of course, one must again apply the serial analysis developed from
(2.21), but without reversing the substance of the argument. In case
for instance, an increase in the tariff will reduce the adverse impact (or





AsKenen's paper amply demonstrates, the role that human capital
plays in determining comparative advantage is not yet well understood,
even in a static sense. The soluticn of the question of the determinants of
individual countries' paths of accumulation of various productive factors
will be even more difficult. Kenen has done a masterful job of surveying the
results to date and outlining the approaches with which future work is
likely to have the highest payoff.
No matter how well-founded the reasons given, the ultimate test of
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such speculations about future research is the outcome. By and large,
my own hunches are in accord with Kenen's. I shall, nonetheless, confine
my remarks to those areas where there are differences in emphasis
between us.
I. THE PRESENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
Kenen is, in my judgment, somewhat too charitable in accepting the
work on research and development to date. While the question of the
relative importance of R & D and human capital in explaining compara-
tive advantage is still open, Kenen seems to accept two aspects of the
work that are surely questionable. First, there are serious questions about
the meaning of the variables used by Keesing and others to represent the
role of R & D. Second, there is good reason to question the appropriate-
ness of a skill index to measure a human capital stock.
The R & D variable used in most regression analysis is either the
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R & D as a percentage of
total employment in the industry, or current expenditures on R & D as a
percentage of sales (which undoubtedly contains a high percentage of
scientists' and engineers' salaries). Both are flow variables. If one were
to consider the stock of "disembodied knowledge," one would surely wish
something like cumulated expenditures on R & D or the present value of
past investments. Even then, there is a question whether R & D is a fac-
tor of production or a produced good. Scientists and engineers, after all,
• represent a certain very highly skilled group of employees. To the extent
• that a production process requires specific design and engineering skills
• carried on in an R & D department, the production process requires a
large human capital input. It may be that R & D activities, essential to
production, are human-capital-intensive activities, and as such, are car-
ried on most successfully in countries with a large stock of human capital
relative to other factors. The collinearity which Kenen notes suggests
that human capital inputs to an industry and its R & D performance are
not independent.
As Kenen shows, a broader skill index reverses the results in terms
ofrelative importance of scientists and engineers in R & D and in other
skill categories. This raises the second question. That is, to what extent
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tagebe tested using a skill index of the type constructed by Keesing and
others? The skill indexes are all derived by taking certain skill groups as
a percentage of total employment in the industry. In one sense, this
implies that there is perfect substitution among all groups included in the
numerator and no substitution between those groups and other groups
excluded from the numerator. Surely, by standards of some developing
countries, some American industries must have more than one skilled
worker per worker.
Measurement of physical capital stock, despite all the conceptual
problems, is usually in some sort of homogeneous unit. Investing in
humans constitutes the same sort of capital accumulation, yet the frac-
tion of workers with skills (above some minimal level) is regarded as an
adequate proxy for the human capital content of the labor force. A simi-
lar procedure with machines would be to take machines of more than
twenty-five horsepower, for example, as a fraction of all machines. It can
also be argued that investing in human capital results in an addition to
capital stock, not the substitution of one kind of labor for another.
A skill index, such as that used by Keesing and others, is therefore
highly suspect as a test of the role of human capital in determining com-
parative advantage. In view of the suspicions which must attach to both
indexes, it is doubtful how much weight can be given to regression results
of the type reported by Keesing and others.
H. AGENDA FOR RESEARCH: POSITIVE ANALYSkS
I fully agree with Kenen's conclusion that use of a multifactor
model, incorporating not only the static aspects of the Heckscher-Ohlin
theory, but also an explanation of how factors are accumulated, will
• stimulate productive research.
I would, however, add several queries to his list. First, what is the
• role of population growth (and rates of change in it) in determining the
relative allocation of investable resources between skills and machines?
This question has two parts because: (a) insofar as population growth
comes from increasing life expectancy, it surely must raise the rate of
return (or the present value) of investment in man relative to investment
in machines; and (b) one can envisage families with limited resources to
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invest in future generations: they can either invest intensively in a few
children (for education, health, nutrition, and the like) or extensively in
many children, allocating fewer resources to each one. Given the syste-
matic patterns observed in the birth rate-death rate pattern as a function
of income levels,itis difficult to believe that economic incentives are
unimportant in determining the choice. One can imagine growth models
incorporating mechanisms of this kind which might go far to explain the
systematic factor-endowment differences observed among countries at
different income levels.
My second question is, in a sense, an expression of doubt about
two of Kenen's empirical assumptions. He believes that the real costs of
training vary inversely with the skills on hand. This is questionable
because increasing the skills of an already skilled person requires a
higher foregone income. In rich countries, increasing skill levels involves
the additional training of already skilled persons, whereas in poor coun-
tries, increasing skill levels may well involve training unskilled persons.
The a priori reasons for believing that the real costs of the latter are
higher are not clear. Kenen's second assumption is that learning-by-doing
is less costly for high-income countries. This is questionable for much
the same reasons expressed in the first assumption. High-income coun-
tries have more human capital invested in the learners, which would tend
to make foregone income during on-the-job training higher.
Kenen makes these assumptions in attempting to explain why different
countries have different human- to physical-capital ratios. His research,
reported in his paper, provides the most fruitful starting point for analysis
of the question, and raises additional questions. Focus upon the role of the
interest rate and population growth (which capital theory suggests may be
interrelated) in determining the allocational pattern between skills and
machines, rather than on training costs, appears promising. Investment
in man generally takes longer, and depreciates over a longer period of
time than does investment in physical capital. One would, therefore,
• expect that at a higher interest rate, it would pay to invest relatively more
in machines than at a lower interest rate. Similarly, a higher rate of
population growth due to increasing life expectancy would increase the
present value of investment in man, whereas a higher birth rate would
reduce it.
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Kenen's discussion of migration suggests one other line for research,
both positive and normative. Trade will, in general, tend to lower the
wage of relatively scarce factors of production and raise the wage of
abundant factors. If the amount invested in skills (and machines) is an
increasing function of the return to investment, trade may reduce invest-
ment in human and physical capital in capital-scarce countries by lower-
ing the return on it. Offsetting this is the higher real income a country
can attain through trade, which tends to increase the country's saving and
therefore its investable resources. If skills are acquired partly in response
to the incentive to do so, and trade reduces those incentives, there may
be a justification for infant-industry intervention somewhat different from
that suggested by Kenen. A subsidy or tariff for capital- (physical and
human) using industries will tend to raise the rate of human and physical
capital accumulation by increasing incentives and returns on it, and lower
the rate of accumulation by lowering real income and therefore saving.
An infant industry subsidy or tariff would then be set at a level where
the increase in investment in human and physical capital generated by
the higher incentives exactly offsets the reduction in investment occa-
sioned by lower present real income as a consequence of reduced trade.
III. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Kenen's plea for more theoretical normative analysis is well taken.
His own heroic attempt illustrates the difficulties of model formulation,
either positive or normative. His model is a worth-while starting point,
although one might question the focus upon training costs, for the rea-
sons I have outlined.
Even if one believes that training costs are the appropriate focal
point for analysis, there remain significant problems, which Kenen pointed
out in his earlier discussions. Perhaps the most important is the question
of how skills are incorporated in the production function. Kenen's pro-
duction function (equation 1.4) has constant returns to scale. In form,
the production function for manufacturers (1.4) is no different from that
in agriculture (equation 1.1), even though it is assumed that manufac-
turing requires skilled workers and agriculture only unskilled workers.
(Is this a good assumption?)
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Ifinvesting inskills adds to resources, a satisfactory treatment
would require a production function of the form:
C SC/LC, I]. (1.4')
where SC/LC represents skills per worker, just as KC/LC represents capital
per worker. In Kenen's treatment, the difference between skilled and
unskilled workers on the demand side is only that skilled workers must
receive a higher wage, and therefore must have a higher value of mar-
ginal product.
At a more technical level, Kenen has amply demonstrated the diffi-
culties inherent in attempting to develop a dynamic model of human and
physical capital accumulation. He set out to analyze the effects of
changes in training costs and tariffs on the growth paths of real income
and human capital accumulation. Yet he succeeds only at the cost of
holding constant: (1) imports of machinery to produce consumer goods
(12); and (2) total investment In a model where all growth occurs
through factor accumulation, it is reasonable to question whether a model
in which there is one degree of freedom in the factor accumulation path
—the allocation of fixed investable resources between the primary sector's
physical capital and the manufacturing sector's human capital—will
answer the questions he poses. One can only conclude, with Kenen, that
additional research is badly needed.
ROBERTE. BALDWIN
UNIVERSITYOF WISCONSIN
International trade theory is presently in the interesting but some-
what confusing state in which there are almost too many promising hypoth-
eses with which to supplement the traditional, simple factor-proportion
approach to explaining the structure of trade. For example, as Peter Kenen
1 Kenen asserts (footnote 54)that(Ii —12)equals investment in primary pro-
duction. Since, however, istotal government revenue plus government saving
(equals investment, by equation 1.21) and 12isthe difference between export earn-
ings and consumer good imports (1.15), 12mustequal the net addition to manufac-
turing physical capital stock.
I
4 — —236EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
points out, both relative differences in labor skills and in research expen-
ditures have tested out as highly significant variables in recent investi-
gations of trade patterns. Moreover, there are a number of other variables
that seem to be important determinants of a country's trade pattern.
It has been suggested, for example, that the existence of natural resource
scarcities in conjunction with a complementary relationship between these
natural resources and physical capital explains Leontief's paradoxical
results. There are also those who claim their analyses show that factor-
intensity reversals within relevant factor-price ratios are so pervasive that
they make the entire factor-supply approach irrelevant. Tariffs and other
market perfections are another set of factors that apparently play an
important role in accounting for actual trade patterns.
What is very much needed in the trade field are careful empirical
efforts to determine the relative importance of these various factors. As
Kenen notes, there are several players in the drama, and we should stop
the common practice of trying to show that some one player is really the
star, if only one is willing to ignore certain other players or concentrate
on some particular scene. It is in this spirit of eclecticism that he con-
siders the relative importance of labor skills and research activities. From
this analysis he concludes that skills may be a more significant deter-
minant of the U. S. trade pattern than production function differences
related to relative research expenditures.
Although there seems to be no doubt that relative supplies of skilled
labor play a major determining role in the composition of U. S. trade,
I should like to underline a few of the well-known difficulties of measur-
ing skill data in human capital terms and also to caution against under-
estimating the importance of research. One method of approaching the
skill problem is to assume that wage differences are a consequence of
differences in skill levels, which, in turn, are the result of differences in
p
investmentin education and on-the-job training. Kenen has performed
the exercise of capitalizing such wage differences among skill groups
employed in U. S. export and import industries and has shown that ex-
ports are considerably more intensive in human capital terms than imports.
Moreover, he is able to reverse the Leontief paradox by capitalizing these
wage differences at rates less than 12.7 per cent and then combining
them with Leontief's measure of tangible capital.
A drawback of computing human capital by capitalizing income
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ences to be the result of differences in education, on-the-job training,
and other forms of human investment.' However, there is growing evi-
dence that market imperfections associated with various economic and
social factors as well as differences in ability are also important explana-
tory factors accounting for wage differences. Nevertheless, other mea-
sures of skills and human capital do indicate that in 1962 U. S. export
industries employed a higher proportion of skilled workers than U. S.
import-competing industries.2 For example, the average years of educa-
tion of workers employed in export industries was greater than in import-
competing industries. Similarly, as is consistent with Leontiefs findings,
export industries employed relatively more professional and managerial
employees as well as craftsmen and foremen than did import-competing
industries. The opposite relationship held with respect to operatives and
nonfarm laborers.3
As an indicator of the relative importance of research efforts, a class
of research workers was constructed from the detailed occupational sta-
tistics of the 1960 sample census and the number of such individuals
employed directly and indirectly in export- versus import-competing
industries was then calculated. A representative bundle of exports turned
out to require about 50 per cent more workers of this type than a repre-
sentative bundle of import substitutes. Similarly, using the R & D sector
in the 1958 input-output table, it was found that the R & D expenditures
associated with export industries were also about 50 per cent higher than
with import-competing industries. In running multiple regressions be-
tween an industry's net trade balance and such variables as years of
education, earnings, capital/labor ratios, and various skill groups, the
research-worker measure invariably turned out to be highly significant.
The proportion of skilled workers and of farmers and farm laborers
employed in each industry are two other variables that were significantly
correlated in a positive manner with the trade-balance variable.
4
• 'By not including the human capital represented by unskilled laborers, Kenen's
procedure tends to overstate the ratio of human capital in export compared to
import-competing production, since in 1959 there were more unskilled laborers
involved in a million dollar's worth of import-competing production than export
• activities.
2 In making these calculations, I used the 1958 input-output table, capital and
labor coefficients estimated for that year, and the 1960 1 / 1000 sample census of
• population.
However, there are slightly more farm plus nonfarm laborers engaged in pro-
ducing a representative export- than import-competing bundle of commodities.
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It would seem, therefore, that as far as the U. S. trade structure of
the early sixtiesis concerned both research and skills are important
•
- explanatoryvariables. Furthermore, using a single gross measure of
• human capital such as years of education, cost of education, or earnings
does not appear to capture all the labor force qualities that inlluence the
pattern of trade. This suggests that other factors are also important in
accounting for the qualitative composition of a country's labor supply.
We need a better empirical and analytical understanding of what these
other variables may be and how they are interrelated with the notion of
human capital. Moreover, we need to explore further the relations be-
tween the nature of technological progress and such factors as natural
resource conditions and the nature of the labor skills available in a
Kenen and those who have been working with him in the trade
workshop at Columbia have in recent years made substantial analytical
and empirical contributions to questions of this sort. As he points out,
the models that have been developed are still quite simple and restrictive
but they are important first steps in moving trade theory away from the
simple factor-proportion approach that has dominated it for too long.
Consequently, I strongly second his point that—partly as a result of
research in the human investment field—international trade theory is at
a stage where a whole series of promising lines of inquiry have opened
up and are much in need of research. Hopefully, those with special com-
petence in the human investment field will not only help to influence the
nature of this research but also will actually participate in it themselves.
D.J. DALY
YORKUNIVERSITY
Thispaper continues the valuable work on the contribution of skills
and human capital to the composition of commodity trade of the United
States. It emphasizes the role of the high levels of human skills and edu-
cation in the U. S. labor force, and the differences in education and skill
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It is worth emphasizing that a new range of empirical data relevant
to this question is available in a recent Brookings study.' In this study
the contribution of a wide range of factor inputs and other topics are
estimated and assessed for the United States and eight European coun-
tries. A Canadian study, using the same framework, has also been pre-
pared.2 These countries provide data in a comprehensive framework for
a group of countries that dominate world trade, especially in manufac-
tured products.
• Although this framework and these data were developed initially to
deal with differences in the levels of real output and growth experience
between countries, they can be easily applied to international trade. For
• example, the data on factor supplies per employed person and output in
a relationto total factor inputs can be used to test the relevance and rela-
tive importance of the theories of Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin to inter-
national trade and comparative advantage in the main industrial countries.
Kenen's data on human capital use the percentages having various
skills or the percentage engaged in R & D, and Anne Krueger's com-
ments raise questions about these measures. Denison measures the whole
education distribution and provides a measure with the desired char-
acteristics.
This point can be illustrated for Canadian data, which have been
assembled and published along the same lines as developed in the Brook-
• ings study. Although the levels of education in Canada are lower than
in the United States, the supplies of other factors of production per
employed persons are higher (e.g., construction, inventories, and natural
resources). In total, the supplies of the total levels of all measured factor
• inputs are almost identical in the two countries, when weighted by their
importance in national income. On the other hand, the levels of output
per employed person and output in relation to total factor inputs is
about 20 per cent lower than in the United States for the economy as a
whole, and the differences are much larger for total manufacturing. The
Canadian data are much more consistent with the Ricardian assumption
1 Denison, E. F. and Poullier, J. P., Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experi-
ence in Nine Western Countries, Washington, 1967.
2Wa1texs, Dorothy, Canadian Income Levels and Growth: An international
Perspective, Staff Study No. 23, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1969.240EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN iNTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
of different production functions in different countries (or quite different
observablepositions on asimilarproductionfunction),thanthe
Heckscher-Ohlin theory which emphasizes the role of different factor
prices and factor supplies and similarities in production conditions.
I hope that future work on trade and comparative advantage can
incorporate more analysis and use of the new material on international
comparisons of real incomes, factor supplies, and output in relation to
• input.
—F